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There is growing effort in the “physics of behavior” that aims at complete quantitative charac-
terization of animal movements under more complex, naturalistic conditions. One reaction to the
resulting explosion of data is the search for low dimensional structure. Here I try to define more
clearly what we mean by the dimensionality of behavior, where observable behavior may consist
either of continuous trajectories or sequences of discrete states. This discussion also serves to isolate
situations in which the dimensionality of behavior is effectively infinite. I conclude with some more
general perspectives about the importance of quantitative phenomenology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even large and complex animals have relatively small
numbers of muscles or joints. In some sense the complex-
ity of behavior is limited by this number of independent
degrees of freedom. Efforts to tame the complexity of
brains and behavior have led to interest in a stronger
notion, namely that the limited set of output degrees of
freedom implies that the dimensionality of behavior is
limited, and that correspondingly we should expect the
dynamics of the neural networks that drive behavior also
to be low–dimensional spaces.
There are many examples where we have direct ev-
idence that motor behaviors are described by low–
dimensional models, in organisms from the worm C ele-
gans to humans and nonhuman primates [1–7]. The ar-
gument that low dimensionality of behavior implies low
dimensionality of neural activity has been made most
explicitly for the case of C elegans [8, 9], but the search
for low–dimensional manifolds in neural activity is more
widespread [10, 11]. Note that in the mammalian brain,
with ∼ 105 neurons in one cortical column, dimensional-
ity could be reduced dramatically yet still be very large.
There are many reasons to be suspicious of the argu-
ment that a small number of behavioral degrees of free-
dom implies low dimensionality of behavior which in turn
implies low dimensionality of neural activity. There are,
for example, ∼ 100 muscles involved in human speech.
Does this mean that our linguistic behavior is ∼ 100 di-
mensional? Should we be searching for 100–dimensional
dynamics in the patterns of neural activity that govern
language production? Should we be worried that there
are ∼ 80 muscles in the fruit fly thorax [12, 13], which
would mean that the potential dimensionalities of fly be-
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ior Virtual Workshop (30 April 2020), organized by GJ Berman
and GJ Stephens. My sincere thanks to Gordon, Greg, and all my
fellow panelists for this wonderful event, especially in these diffi-
cult times. Videos of the lectures and discussion are available at
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havior and human language are not so different? In fact
even C elegans has 95 body wall muscles [14]; the claim
that the dynamics of worm behavior is low–dimensional
rests on observations of the behavior itself, not on limits
set by the anatomy.
Perhaps the comparison of flies and human language
highlights the need for a more precise definition of the
“dimensionality of behavior.” This is made more urgent
by the explosive growth of methods for more quantitative
measurements of behavior [5, 15–21]. If these data can
be reduced to low–dimensional descriptions, then we have
achieved an enormous simplification, with practical con-
sequences for further analysis. We might also have theo-
retical predictions about the dimensionality of behavior
(either low or high), and then measuring dimensionality
would provide decisive tests of these theories.
As a preface to the discussion, it should be remembered
that the current wave of quantitative approaches to the
analysis of behavior integrates several very different in-
tellectual traditions, including classical ethology, physi-
ology, theoretical physics, engineering, and computer sci-
ence. Different ideas and methods will seem obvious or
opaque to these very different communities. In the inter-
est of clarity I take the risk of saying some things that
will be well known to some audiences, and focus on what
I hope are simple versions of general ideas.
II. TWO EXAMPLES
To work toward a more precise definition, let’s start
with the case in which the behavior we observe is just
a single function of time x(t). I will assume that this is
a completely autonomous behavior, and that across the
time windows we consider the statistical structure of the
behavior is stationary; both of these are common but
possibly unrealizable idealizations. As is familiar from
now classical literature on dynamical systems [22, 23], it
is possible to tease out of this single time series a higher
dimensional description of the underlying dynamics, so
that the apparent dimensionality of the data is not a
bound on the dimensionality of the dynamics.
2On the other hand, suppose that a complete descrip-
tion of the observed behavior were given by
τc
dx(t)
dt
= −x(t) + η(t), (1)
where the η(t) is white noise,
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = 2τc〈x
2〉δ(t− t′). (2)
I think most people would agree that if this is a com-
plete description of the dynamics, then the system really
is one dimensional. It is important that the noise source
is white; non–white noise sources, which themselves are
correlated over time, are equivalent to having hidden de-
grees of freedom that carry these correlations.
The observable consequences of the dynamics in Eqs
(1, 2) are well known: x(t) will be a Gaussian stochastic
process, with the two–point correlation function
C1(τ) = 〈x(t)x(t + τ)〉 = 〈x
2〉e−|τ |/τc . (3)
We recall that for a Gaussian process, once we specify
the two–point function there is nothing else to say about
the system. Importantly, we can turn this around: if the
observed behavior is a Gaussian stochastic process, and
the correlations decay exponentially as in Eq (3), then
Eqs (1, 2) are a complete description of the dynamics.
Suppose the real dynamics involve not only the observ-
able x(t) but also an internal variable y(t),
τc
d
dt
[
x(t)
y(t)
]
= −
[
1 a
a 1
] [
x(t)
y(t)
]
+
[
η1(t)
η2(t)
]
, (4)
where the driving noises are white and independent,
〈ηi(t)ηj(t
′)〉 = 2τc〈x
2〉(1 − a2)δijδ(t− t
′). (5)
Notice that since y is hidden, the units of this variable
are arbitrary, which allows us to have the strength of the
noise driving each variable be the same without loss of
generality, while the choice to give each variable the same
correlation time is just for illustration, as is the symme-
try of the dynamical matrix. Looking at these equations,
it seems easy to agree that the system is two dimensional.
Again, x(t) again is Gaussian, but the correlation func-
tion has two exponential decays,
C2(τ) = 〈x(t)x(t + τ)〉 =
1
2
〈x2〉(1 − a2)
[
1
1 + a
e−(1+a)|τ |/τc +
1
1− a
e−(1−a)|τ |/τc
]
. (6)
We see that a one dimensional system generates behav-
ior with a correlation function that has one exponential
decay, while a two dimensional system generates a corre-
lation function with two exponential decays. We would
like to turn this around, and say that if we observe cer-
tain structure in the behavioral correlations, then we can
infer the underlying dimensionality.
III. GAUSSIAN PROCESSES MORE
GENERALLY
Trying to analyze the structure of correlations by con-
structing explicit dynamical equations, as in Eqs (1) or
(4), may not be the best approach. In particular, if there
are hidden dimensions, then there is no preferred coor-
dinate system in the space of unmeasured variables, and
hence no unique form for the dynamical equations. Let
us instead focus on the probability distribution of trajec-
tories x(t). For Gaussian processes this has the form
P [x(t)] =
1
Z
e−S[x(t)] (7)
S[x(t)] =
1
2
∫
dt
∫
dt′ x(t)K(t− t′)x(t′), (8)
where the integrals run over the interval of our observa-
tions, which should be long. The kernel K(τ) is inverse
to the correlation function,∫
dt′′K(t− t′′)〈x(t′′)x(t′)〉 = δ(t− t′). (9)
We can divide the full trajectory x(t) into the past, with
t ≤ 0, and the future, with t > 0. Schematically,
S[x(t)] =
1
2
xpast ·Kpp · xpast +
1
2
xfut ·Kff · xfut
+xpast ·Kpf · xfut, (10)
where Kpf couples the past and future. More explicitly,
xpast ·Kpf · xfut =
∫ ∞
0
dt
∫ ∞
0
dt′ x(−t)K(t+ t′)x(t′).
(11)
If Kpf is of finite rank, so that
K(t+ t′) =
D∑
n=1
anφn(t)φn(t
′), (12)
then everything that we can predict about future behav-
ior given knowledge of past behavior is captured by D
3features,
P [xfut|xpast] = P [xfut|{Fn}] (13)
Fn =
∫ ∞
0
dt φn(t)x(−t). (14)
Equation (13) is telling us that the features {Fn} pro-
vide “sufficient statistics” for making predictions. We
recall that in a dynamical system with D variables,
dyi
dt
= gi({yj}) + ηi(t), i = 1, 2, · · · , D, (15)
predicting the future (t > 0) requires specifying D initial
conditions (at t = 0). In this precise sense, the number
of variables that we need to achieve maximum predictive
power is the dimensionality of the dynamical system. To
complete the argument, we need to show that Kpf has fi-
nite rank when correlations decay as a finite combination
of exponentials; see Appendix A.
In the case of Gaussian stochastic processes we thus
arrive at a recipe for defining the dimensionality of the
underlying dynamics. We estimate the correlation func-
tion, take its inverse to find the kernel, and isolate the
part of this kernel which couples past and future. If this
past–future kernel is of finite rank, then we can identify
this rank with the dimensionality of the system.
This discussion still refers only to Gaussian processes,
but we see that the search for low–dimensional descrip-
tions could fail, qualitatively. It is possible that the past–
future kernel Kpf is not of finite rank; more generally if
we analyze signals in a window of size T then the rank
can grow with T . This happens, for example, if behav-
ioral correlations decay as a power of time,
〈x(t)x(t′)〉 =
tα0
tα0 + |t− t
′|α
. (16)
Under these conditions the system is infinite dimensional.
IV. BEYOND GAUSSIANS
What emerges from the analysis of Gaussian stochastic
processes is that dimensionality can be measured through
the problem of prediction. Let us see how we can make
this more general, beyond the Gaussian case.
Let us break a very long observation of time series into
many examples of a time window −T < t < T . Within
each window, the trajectory x(t < 0) defines the past
xpast, and x(t > 0) defines the future xfut. Across a
large ensemble of these windows we can define the joint
probability distribution PT (xpast,xfut). To characterize
the possibility of making predictions we can measure the
mutual information between past and future, or the “pre-
dictive information” [24],
Ipred(T ) ≡ I(xpast;xfut) =
∑
xpast
∑
xfut
PT (xpast,xfut) log
[
PT (xpast,xfut)
PT (xpast)PT (xfut)
]
. (17)
The predictive information can have very different
qualitative behaviors as T becomes large [24].1 For a
time series that can be captured by a finite state Markov
process, or more generally described by a finite correla-
tion time, then Ipred(T ) is finite as T →∞. On the other
hand, for Gaussian processes with correlation functions
that decay as a power, as in Eq (16), the predictive infor-
mation diverges logarithmically, Ipred(T →∞) ∝ logT .
In the example of a dynamical system withD variables,
as in Eq (15), all the predictive power available will be
1 If we observe a continuous variable x(t) in continuous time, then
smoothness across t = 0 generates a formal divergence in the mu-
tual information between past and future. Modern analyses of
behavior typically begin with video data, with time in discrete
frames, evading this problem. Alternatively, if measurements
on x(t) include a small amount of white noise, then the predic-
tive information becomes finite even without discrete time steps.
Thanks to A Frishman for emphasizing the need for care here.
realized if we can specifyD numbers, which are the initial
conditions for integrating the differential equations. Thus
we consider mappings of the past into d features,
Md : xpast → {Fµ}, µ = 1, 2, · · · , d. (18)
For any choice of features we can compute how much
predictive information has been captured, and then we
can maximize over the mapping, resulting in
Ipred(T ; d) = max
Md
I({Fµ};xfut), (19)
which is the maximum predictive information we can cap-
ture with d features in windows of duration T .
If the system truly isD dimensional, thenD features of
the past are sufficient to capture all of the available pre-
dictive information. This means that a plot of Ipred(T ; d)
vs d will saturate. To be precise we are interested in what
happens at large T , so we can define
lim
T→∞
Ipred(T ; d)
Ipred(T )
= f(d). (20)
4If we find that f(d ≥ D) = 1, then we can conclude that
the behavior has dimensionality D.
In words, the dimensionality of behavior is the min-
imum number of features of the past needed to make
maximally informative predictions about the future, and
to be precise the past should be taken to be of long du-
ration. While very general, it should be admitted that
this definition is much more complex than the analy-
sis of correlation functions that works in the Gaussian
case. To use this definition we have to search over all
possible mappings Md of long past trajectories into d–
dimensional feature spaces, and we have to estimate the
mutual information between these d variables and some
representation of the future trajectory. Both of these
steps are challenging.
V. DISCRETE STATES
In many cases it is natural to describe animal behavior
as moving through a sequence of discrete states. We do
this, for example, when we transcribe human speech to
text, and when we describe a bacterium as running or
tumbling [25]. This identification of discrete states is not
just an arbitrary quantization of continuous motor out-
puts, nor should it be a qualitative judgement by human
observers. Discrete states should correspond to distin-
guishable clusters, or resolvable peaks in the distribution
over the natural continuous variables, and the dynamics
should consist of movements in the neighborhood of one
peak that are punctuated by relatively rapid jumps to
another peak (e.g., Ref [16]). A “mechanism” for such
discreteness is the existence of multiple dynamical at-
tractors, with jumps driven by noise (e.g., Refs [5, 6]).
When behavioral states are discrete, how do we de-
fine dimensionality? Once again it is useful to think
about the simplest case, where there are just two be-
havioral states—perhaps “doing something” and “doing
nothing”—and time is marked by discrete ticks of a clock.
We can represent the two states at each time t by an Ising
variable σt = ±1. If the sequence of behavioral states
were Markovian, then σt depends only on σt−1, and be-
cause σ2 = 1 the only possible stationary probability
distribution for the sequences σ1, σ2, · · · , σT is
P ({σt}) =
1
Z
exp
[
h
∑
t
σt + J
∑
t
σt−1σt
]
, (21)
which is the one–dimensional Ising model with nearest
neighbor interactions. Importantly, if we measure the
correlations of the fluctuations in behavioral state around
its mean,
C(t− t′) ≡ 〈(σt − 〈σ〉) (σt′ − 〈σ〉)〉, (22)
we find that these correlations decay exponentially,
C(t− t′) = C(0)e−|t−t
′|/τc , (23)
where we can express τc in terms of h and J [26]. This
reminds us of the exponential decays in the continuous
case with Gaussian fluctuations, where they provide a
signature of low dimensionality.
Suppose that we have only two states, but observe
correlations that do not decay as a single exponential.
Then the probability distribution P ({σt}) must have
terms that describe explicit dependences of σt on σt′ with
t− t′ > 1. This can be true only if there are some hidden
states or variables that carry memory across the tempo-
ral gap t− t′. A sensible definition for the dimensionality
of behavior then refers to these internal variables.
Imagine that we observe the mean of the behavioral
variable, 〈σ〉, and the correlation function C(t−t′). What
can we say about the probability distribution P ({σt})?
There are infinitely many models that are consistent with
measurements of just the (two–point) correlations, but
there is one that stands out as having minimal structure
required to match these observations [27]. Said another
way, there is a unique model that predicts the observed
correlations but otherwise generates behavioral sequences
that are as random as possible. This minimally struc-
tured model is the one that has the largest possible en-
tropy, and it has the form
P ({σt}) =
1
Z
exp

h∑
t
σt +
1
2
∑
t,t′
J(t− t′)σtσt′

 ,
(24)
where the parameter h must be adjusted so that the
model predicts the observed mean behavior 〈σ〉, and the
function J(t − t′) must be adjusted so that the model
predicts the observed correlation function C(t− t′).
Maximum entropy models have a long history, and a
deep connection to statistical mechanics [27]. As ap-
plied to temporal sequences, the maximum entropy mod-
els sometimes are referred to as maximum caliber [28].
The Boltzmann distribution, which describes a system
in thermal equilibrium, can be derived as the maxi-
mum entropy distribution over microscopic states of the
the system that is consistent with its mean energy, and
this sometimes leads to the impression that maximum
entropy models only describe equilibrium systems, but
this isn’t correct. In this discussion we are explicitly
using the maximum entropy idea to describe distribu-
tions of sequences or trajectories, not distributions over
states as with the Boltzmann distribution. In the case of
just two states, if we only constrain the two–point cor-
relations C(t − t′) we cannot distinguish the arrow of
time, but as soon as we have more states, or constrain
higher–order correlations, the maximum entropy model
can break time–reversal invariance or detailed balance.
For biological systems there has been interest in the use
of maximum entropy methods to describe amino acid se-
quence variation in protein families [29–31], patterns of
electrical activity in populations of neurons [32–36], ve-
locity fluctuations in flocks of birds [37, 38], and more.
There have been more limited attempts to use these ideas
5in describing temporal sequences, either in neural popu-
lations [39] or flocks [40–42].
The maximum entropy model in Eq (24) can be rewrit-
ten exactly as a model in which the behavioral state at
time t depends only on some internal variable x(t):
P ({σt}) =
∫
DxP [x(t)]
∏
t
P (σt|x(t) + h), (25)
P (σ|x+ h) =
exp [σ · (x+ h)]
2 cosh(x + h)
, (26)
and the distribution of the internal variable is
P [x(t)] =
1
Z ′
e−S
′[x(t)] (27)
S′[x(t)] =
1
2
∑
t,t′
x(t)K(t− t′)x(t′)
−
∑
t
ln cosh (x(t) + h) , (28)
where K(t) is the matrix inverse of the function J(t),∑
t′′
K(t− t′′)J(t′′ − t′) = δtt′ . (29)
Notice that since J(0) multiplies σtσt = 1, its value can’t
change the observable statistics of behavior, so we have
some freedom in writing the model this way.2
Starting from discrete binary states we thus are led
back to an underlying continuous variable, and we can
carry over our definitions of dimensionality. Although
x(t) is not Gaussian, the only coupling of past and fu-
ture is through a kernel K(t), just as in the Gaussian
case, as we see by comparing Eqs (8) and (28). This
kernel is not the inverse of the observed behavioral cor-
relations, but of the effective interactions between states
at different times, J(τ). But, importantly, we are con-
sidering quantities that are determined by the correlation
function and hence the problem is conceptually similar to
the Gaussian case: we analyze the correlations to derive
a kernel, and the dimensionality of behavior is the rank of
this kernel. The maximum entropy model plays a useful
role because it is the least structured model consistent
with the observed correlations.
If x(t) is one–dimensional, then the interactions J(t) ∼
J0e
−|t|/τ . The correlations C(t) are predicted to decay
exponentially at large |t|, but by the time this limit is
reached the correlations may be so weak that this is hard
to measure convincingly. At the more accessible interme-
diate times the behavior of C(t) can be complicated even
2 Models where the observed degrees of freedom depend on hidden
or latent variables, but not directly on one another, are some-
times set in opposition to statistical physics models, where it is
more natural to think about direct interactions. But this exam-
ple shows that these pictures can be mathematically equivalent;
see also the Supplementary material of Ref [43].
though the underlying dynamics are one–dimensional. At
the opposite extreme, if x(t) has effectively infinite di-
mensionality, then we can have J(t) ∼ J0|t|−α, as in Eq
(16). Ising models with such power–law interactions are
the subject of a large literature in statistical physics; the
richest behaviors are at α = 2, where results presaged
major developments in the renormalization group and
topological phase transitions [44–47]. It would be fasci-
nating if these models emerged as effective descriptions
of strongly non–Markovian sequences in animal behavior.
VI. PERSPECTIVES
The explosion of quantitative data on animal behavior
is exciting in part because these essentially macroscopic
behaviors—rather than their microscopic mechanisms—
are what first strike us as being interesting about living
systems. Behaviors have been selected by evolution for
their utility, and as we observe them it is difficult not to
think of them as purposeful or intelligent. Understanding
the phenomena of life means explaining how these behav-
iors arise, ultimately from interactions among molecules
that obey the same laws of physics as in inanimate (and
unintelligent) matter. But what is it, exactly, that we
are trying to explain?
If we want to explain why we look like our parents, a
qualitative answer is that we carry copies of their DNA.
But if we want to understand the reliability with which
traits are passed from generation to generation,3 then
talking about DNA structure is not enough—the energy
differences between correct and incorrect base pairing are
not sufficient to explain the reliability of molecular copy-
ing if the reactions are allowed to come to thermal equi-
librium, and this problem arises not just in DNA repli-
cation but in every step of molecular information trans-
mission. Cells achieve reliability by holding these reac-
tions away from equilibrium, allowing for proofreading or
error–correction [49, 50]. In the absence of proofreading,
the majority of proteins would contain at least one in-
correct amino acid, and roughly 10% of our genes would
be different from those carried by either parent; these er-
ror rates are orders of magnitude larger than observed.
These quantitative differences are so large that life with-
out proofreading would be qualitatively different.4
The example of proofreading highlights the importance
of starting with a quantitative characterization of the
phenomena we are trying to explain. In an era of highly
3 A poetic formulation of this problem is Schro¨dinger’s descrip-
tion of the Hapsburger lippe, passed for centuries through the
imperial family of Austria [48].
4 In retroviruses, including HIV, reproduction includes a step of
reverse transcription, which occurs without proofreading. The
dramatically accelerated pace of evolution in these viruses gives
a glimpse of how different life would be if the transmission of
genetic information depended on base pairing alone.
6mechanistic biology, this emphasis on phenomenologi-
cal description may seem odd. But quantitative phe-
nomenology has been foundational, certainly in physics
and also in the mainstream of biology. Mendel’s genetics
was a phenomenological description of the patterns of in-
heritance, and the realization that genes are arranged lin-
early along chromosomes came from a more refined quan-
titative analysis of these same patterns [51]. The work of
Hodgkin and Huxley led to our modern understanding of
electrical activity in terms of ion channel dynamics, but
explicitly eschewed mechanistic claims in favor of phe-
nomenology [52]. The idea that transmission across a
synapse depends on transmitter molecules packaged into
vesicles emerged from the quantitative analysis of voltage
fluctuations at the neuromuscular junction [53].
Even when we are searching for microscopic mecha-
nisms, it is not anachronistic to explore macroscopic de-
scriptions. Time and again, the scientific community
has leaned on phenomenology to imagine the underlying
mechanisms, often taking literally the individual terms
in a mathematical description as representing the actual
microscopic elements for which we should be searching,
whether these are genes, ion channels, synaptic vesicles,
or quarks [54–56]. What is anachronistic, in the literal
sense of the word, is to believe that microscopic mecha-
nisms were discovered by direct microscopic observations
without guidance from phenomenology on a larger scale.
The idea that quantitative phenomenology would pro-
vide a foundation for understanding brains and minds
took hold very early in the modern era. In the second
half of the nineteenth century, many people were trying
to turn observations on seeing and hearing into quanti-
tative experiments, creating a subject that would come
to be called psychophysics [65]. By ∼1910, these experi-
ments were sufficiently well developed that Lorentz could
look at data on the “minimum visible” and suggest that
the retina is capable of counting single photons [66], and
Rayleigh could identify the conflict between our ability to
localize low–frequency sounds and the conventional wis-
dom that we are “phase deaf” [67]. Both of these essen-
tially theoretical observations, grounded in quantitative
descriptions of human behavior, would drive experimen-
tal efforts that unfolded over more than fifty years.
Also ∼1910, von Frisch was doing psychophysics exper-
iments to demonstrate bees could, in fact, discriminate
among the beautiful colors of the flowers that they polli-
nate [68]. But he took these experiments in a very differ-
ent direction, focusing not on the discrete choices made
by individual bees, but on how these individuals com-
municated their sensory experiences to other residents of
the hive. This work led to the discovery of the “dance
language” of bees. While von Frisch often used simplified
stimuli, and counted whether bees arrived at a destina-
tion or not, it was crucial that intermediate behaviors—
the dance—were unconstrained and fully natural.
What grew out of the work by von Frisch and others
was the field of ethology [69], which emphasizes the rich-
ness of behavior in its natural context, the context in
which it was selected for by evolution. Because etholo-
gists wrestle with complex behaviors, they often resort
to verbal description. In contrast, psychophysicists focus
on situations in which subjects are constrained to a small
number of discrete alternative behaviors, so it is natural
to give a quantitative description by estimating the prob-
abilities of different choices under various conditions.
The emergence of a quantitative language for the anal-
ysis of psychophysical experiments was aided by the fo-
cus on constrained behaviors, but was not an automatic
consequence of this focus. For photon counting in vi-
sion, the underlying physics suggests how the probabil-
ity of seeing vs. not seeing will depend on light intensity
[70], but the observation that human observers behave as
predicted points to profound facts about the underlying
mechanisms [71]. During World War II, attempts to for-
malize the problems of radar operators and communica-
tion with pilots led to a more general view of the choices
among discrete alternative behaviors as being discrimi-
nations among signals in a background of noise [72]. In
the 1950s and 60s this view was exported to experimental
psychology and developed further into the modern form
of signal detection theory [65]. Much of this now seems
like an exercise in probability and statistics, something
obviously correct, but the early literature records con-
siderable skepticism about whether this (or perhaps any)
mathematization of human behavior would succeed.
Much has been learned through both the ethological
and the psychophysical approaches, yet it is easy for
advocates of the two approaches to talk past one an-
other. Still, it does not seem unfair to note that the
traditional ethological approach is missing the drive for
quantification, while the traditional psychophysical ap-
proach achieves quantitative sophistication by excluding
much of what impresses us about behavior. The chal-
lenge is not to find what each tradition is lacking, but
to find a way of combining the best from both, and this
brings us back to the questions asked at the outset.
A quantitative characterization of naturalistic behav-
iors requires that we attach comparable numbers to very
different kinds of time series. Dimensionality is a can-
didate for this sort of characterization. When we do
psychophysics, we characterize behaviors with numbers
that are meaningfully comparable across situations and
across species. To give but one example, we can discuss
the accumulation of evidence for decisions that humans
and non–human primates make based on visual inputs,
but we can use the same mathematical language to dis-
cuss decisions made by rodent based on auditory inputs
[73]. Perhaps the dimensionality of behavior will provide
part of the needed unifying mathematical language for
more natural behaviors.
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Appendix A: Past-future kernels, explicitly
We are interested in the behavior of the kernelK when
the correlation function C is a sum of exponentials. As
noted above, we need to be a little careful to make this
problem well posed. If we monitor a continuous variable
in continuous time, then continuity leads to an infinite
mutual information between x(t−) and x(t+). We can
solve this either by assuming that observation are made
at discrete ticks of a clock (as in video recordings), or by
assuming that observations are made in a background of
white noise. Here I will take the second approach.
The statement that the correlation function is a sum of
exponentials, but measurements are in a background of
white noise, means that the observed correlation function
〈x(t)x(0)〉 ≡ C(t) =
M∑
µ=1
Aµe
−|t|/τµ +N δ(t), (A1)
where N is the strength of the noise. We want to con-
struct the kernel K(t) that is the operator inverse to C,
as in Eq (9). We recall that this can be done by passing
to Fourier space:
G(ω) =
∫
dt e+iωtC(t) (A2)
K(t) =
∫
dω
2pi
e−iωt
1
G(ω)
. (A3)
From Eq (A1) we can see that
G(ω) =
∫
dt e+iωt
[
M∑
µ=1
Aµe
−|t|/τµ +N δ(t)
]
(A4)
=
M∑
µ=1
2Aµτµ
1 + (ωτµ)2
+N . (A5)
Then to find K(t) we invert and transform back, being
careful to isolate the contribution of the white noise term:
K(t) =
∫
dω
2pi
e−iωt
[
M∑
µ=1
2Aµτµ
1 + (ωτµ)2
+N
]−1
(A6)
=
∫
dω
2pi
e−iωt
[
1
N
−
PM−1(ω
2)
PM (ω2)
]
, (A7)
where
PM−1(ω
2) =
M∑
µ=1
2Aµτµ
∏
ν 6=µ
[1 + (ωτν)
2] (A8)
is a M − 1st order polynomial in ω2 and
PM (ω
2) = N
(
N
M∏
µ=1
[1 + (ωτµ)
2] + PM−1(ω
2)
)
(A9)
is a Mth order polynomial in ω2. Note that both poly-
nomials have all real and positive coefficients.
We notice that PM−1(ω
2)/PM (ω
2) vanishes at large
|ω|, and e−iωt vanishes for values of ω with large negative
(positive) imaginary part if t > 0 (t < 0). This means
that we can do the integral over ω in Eq (A7) by closing
a contour in the complex plane. Then we can use the
fact that
PM (ω
2) = B
M∏
n=1
(ω2 − ω2n), (A10)
where B is a constant and the {ω2n} are the roots of the
polynomial. The simplest case is where all ω2n are real,
in which case they must be negative and we can write
ωn = −iλn, with λn > 0. Then for t > 0 we close the
contour in the lower half plane, which picks out the poles
at ω = ωn, while for t < 0 we close the contour in the
upper half plane, which picks out the poles at ω = −ωn.
The result is that
K(t) =
1
N
δ(t)−
∫
dω
2pi
e−iωt
PM−1(ω
2)
PM (ω2)
(A11)
=
1
N
δ(t)−
1
B
∑
n
PM−1(ω
2 = −λ2n)
2λn
∏
m 6=n(λ
2
m − λ
2
n)
e−λn|t|.
(A12)
If we look back at the derivation of Eq (11), we can see
that a delta function term in K(t) does not contribute to
coupling past and future. Thus K(t > 0) collapses into
the form of Eq (12):
K(t+ t′) =
M∑
n=1
anφn(t)φn(t
′) (A13)
an =
1
B
PM−1(ω
2 = −λ2n)
2λn
∏
m 6=n(λ
2
m − λ
2
n)
(A14)
φn(t) = e
−λnt, (A15)
and the dimensionality D = M , as we hoped: if the
observed behavioral variable is Gaussian, and the corre-
lation function can be written as the sum of M expo-
nentials, then the system has underlying dimensionality
D =M .
It is useful to work out the case M = 1. Then we have
〈x(t)x(0)〉 ≡ C(t) = Ae−|t|/τc +N δ(t), (A16)
and after some algebra we find
K(t) = a1e
−λ1|t| (A17)
λ1 =
1
τc
√
1 + 2Aτc/N . (A18)
8It is useful to think more explicitly about the fact that
we have embedded a correlated signal in the background
of white noise, so we can write
x(t) = y(t) + η(t) (A19)
〈y(t)y(t′)〉 = Ae−|t−t
′|/τc (A20)
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = N δ(t− t′). (A21)
Only y(t) is predictable, the best predictions would be
based on knowledge of y(t = 0). One can then show that
the best estimate of this quantity given observations on
the noisy x(t) is
yest(0) =
∫ ∞
0
dtK(t)x(−t), (A22)
with the same K(t) as in Eq (A17). Thus, asking for
the optimal prediction is the same as asking for the opti-
mal separation of the predictable signal from the unpre-
dictable noise [57].
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